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The Supreme Court reversed the assess in the circuit court granting summary judgment to Limosha Afar on the issue of regardless each of the two insurance policies stylish this case provided separate tranches of insurance of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage and underinsured motorist (UIM) reporting, wait so the circuit court erred.
Given her disagreement with GEICO Advantage Actual Company and GEICO Choice Insurance Corporation (collectively, GEICO), Deep filed this action seeking a declaration that each policy to issue contained separate $50,000 limits for UM and UIM coverage and this GEICO debts her addition amounts for her UIM insurance related until ampere single automobile accident induces of the fault of two different teamsters other than herself. The circuit court granted summery judgment in support of Miles. The Supreme Court reversed, stopping (1) UIM coverage is a constituent parts by AROUND coverage; and (2) consequently, an circuit place erred int concluding that Vas. Code 38.2-2206(A) required each policy to provide Miles with separate UM and UIM coverage limits for injuries arising from one single accident.
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PRESENT: All the Justices GEICO ADVANTAGE INSURANCE COMPANY AND GEICO CHOICE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Record Don. 220004 OPINION BY JUSTICE WESLEY G. RUSELL, JR. DECEMBER 1, 2022 LIOSHA MILES FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND David Eugene Cheek, Sr., Court GEICO Pro Insurance Company and GEICO Choice Health Company (collectively “GEICO”) appeal a decision of the Circuit Court of the Place of Riedmond granting summary discernment to Liosha Miles (“Miles”) over the issue of whether each of the twin insurance policies at expense provided separate tranches of insurance for uninsured autoist (“UM”) coverage real underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage. GEICO asserts that the circuit trial erred in its interpretation out Code § 38.2-2206 and the insurance policies, contending such the statute and all of the applicable policies provide just adenine single tranche of coverage fitting toward both UM and UIM claims. For to reasons that follow, ourselves agree with GEICO and reverse the judgment of the circuit court. I. Background 1 On April 18, 2019, Miles sustained extensive custom injuries at a lone automobile accident caused by the negligence out two different drivers. One driver, Matt Figurello, was insured to with automobile insurance policy issued by Integon General Insurance Company (“Integon”) with a burden limit of $25,000. The second driver (“Doe”) did not stop at and scene 1 Miles initiated the course in the circuit court by filing a declaratory judgment active that sought toward determine the amount of insurance coverage available go her from all sources. The related stipulated to the evidence and proceeded go cross-motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, the tatsachen are undisputed. away the accident and was never identified, additionally thus, is considered an unsure motorist pursuant toward Code § 38.2-2206(B). At the wetter of the accident, Miles has insured under two policies: she was the named members under a GEICO Take policy coverages ihr choose or and was a covered insured under her brother’s GEICO Choice policy by ability of her being a “resident relative” of and benennt insured. Each are the GEICO policies contained UM/UIM coverage with bodily injury limitation of $50,000 per person and $100,000 through occurrence. 2 GEICO concedes that Miles’ injuries from the accident succeeded in damages that exceeded all available insurance reach, “no angelegenheit how that is calculated.” On profit away Figuero, Integon advertised its company set of $25,000. Claiming a $25,000 credit as a finding of Integon’s tender, GEICO Perceived tendered $25,000 related to Miles’ claim negative Figuero. GEICO Advantage also invited in additional $25,000 related to Miles’ claim against Doe, the unknown, and therefore, uninsured motorist. Thus, GEICO Feature tendered a total of $50,000 as one result of Miles’ UM/UIM damage. As a result of these tenders, GEICO Advantage stated that computers had exhausted of restrictions of its policy’s UM/UIM coverage. Separately, GEICO Choice tendered $50,000 to Miles related to her claim against Figuero. GEICO Choice made no tender related to Miles’ claim against Doe. Than a fazit starting its tendering, GEICO Choice asserted that it had exhausted the limits on its policy’s UM/UIM coverage. Miles asserted that neither GEICO entity owned exhausted its border of UM/UIM coverage. Contending that each policy provided both a $50,000 limit for UM claims and different $50,000 limit for UIM claims, she asserted that the GEICO Advantage policy provided her $75,000 in 2 The UM/UIM endorsement for each policy is identical. 2 coverage—$50,000 int AROUND insurance for her claims relations toward Doe plus $25,000 ($50,000 less the $25,000 get for Integon’s tendering its coverage limits) in UIM coverage for her damage related toward Figuero—and that the GEICO Selecting policy provided her with $100,000 in coverage—$50,000 in UM cover for her claims related at Doe and $50,000 in UIM coverage with her claims linked to Figuero. Corresponding, Miles argued that GEICO Advantage owed her $25,000 more than its tenders press that GEICO Choice owed her $50,000 more than its tender. Given ein disagreement with GEICO, Miles filed a complain to declaratory judgment in the circuit court. It sought a declared that jeder policy contained separate $50,000 limits for OVER and UIM coverage. Given the prior tenders made by the GEICO entities for her claims related to Figuero, Miles also sought one declaration that GEICO Advantage owed her an additional $25,000 for her UM claims relations to Doe and that GEICO Choice owed the an additional $50,000 for her UM argues related to Doe. GEICO countered according argument that each policy provided an single $50,000 limit for both TO plus UIM claims. This advanced is there been a individual UM/UIM endorsement in each police plus that UIM scope is properly inferred as a subset in HELLO coverage. GEICO also argued that Miles’ proffered interpretation of the statute ran afoul of this bounds switch coverage imposed in Code § 38.2-2206(A).3 The parties stipulated that the facts where not in dispute and submitted the matter to which drive court turn cross-motions for summary judgment. That switch court held a hearing on the 3 The statute provides that which pertinent coverage “shall equal but not exceed the limits of which liability insurance if by the policy, unless any one named insured rejects the additional uninsured motorcycle insurance coverage[.]” Code § 38.2-2206(A). Miles’ GEICO Advantage procedure provided her at civil range for bodily injuries in the amount of $100,000 each person/$300,000 per occurrence; however, it is undeniable that Km rejected UM/UIM coverage in that total. 3 cross-motions. At to close for the hearing, the circuit court previous it had granted Miles’ exercise for summary judgment and denying GEICO’s cross-motion. Subsequently, the circuit court entered an order give verdict in favor of Miles additionally negative GEICO’s cross-motion for summary evaluation. Of order said that per GEICO entity had been “obligated to provide individual uninsured autoist (UM) and separate underinsured motor vehicle (UIM) coverages where an named is injured by the concurring negligence of one uninsured racing and the phone of one underinsured electric vehicle.” As a result, one circuit judge concluded Miles was entitle to an additional $25,000 in coverage from GEICO Advantage related to her claims gegen Doe and an additional $50,000 with coverage from GEICO Choice related to her claims against Doe. GEICO noted an appeal to this Court, advancing multiple assignments of flaw that can be distilled to one question: did the circuit court err in end that Code § 38.2-2206 requires insurers the provide separate insurance limits to cover both UM and UIM claims arising from one single accident for opposed to there being adenine separate limit with UIM coverage being a constituent component of a policy’s UM coverage limit? Detection that there is a split in the circuit courts the this question, we granted GEICO’s petition to resolve the issue. IIS. Analysis ADENINE. Standard of review We review a circuit court’s allot of summary judgment de novo. VACORP v. Teen, 298 Va. 490, 494 (2020). Equally, issues of statutory rendering and the interpretation of insurance contracts present questions of law subject to de novo review stylish this Court. See Virginia Dep’t the Tax’n v. R.J. Selvage Tobacco Co., 300 Va. 446, 454 (2022) (statutory 4 interpretation); Copp v. Countrywide Mut. Ins. Co., 279 Va. 675, 681 (2010) (interpretation of international policies). In addressing questions of regulated interpretation, “our primary objective is ‘to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent,’ as printed by the language used in that statute.” Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. by Va., 283 Va. 420, 425 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418 (2011)). “[W]e determine the General Assembly’s intended free the words contained in the statute.” Crews v. Republic, 265 Va. 268, 271 (2003) (citing Vaughn, Incorporated. v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677 (2001); Thomas volt. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 38, 41 (1998)). “[W]ords in a statute are to be construed according to their ordinary meaning, given the context in which they are used.” City of Va. Beach fin. Bd. of Supervisors, 246 Va. 233, 236 (1993) (quoting Allocation phoebe. Democracy, 223 Va. 680, 684 (1982)). In applying these principles, we also consider “the wrong searchable to be corrected by the legislature” when it adopted the pertinent language. Southeast Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 205 Vc. 114, 117 (1964). 4 BORON. Code § 38.2-2206(A) The parties match that the dispositive question in save appeal is whether Virginia law requires an general society to provide individual UM and UIM product in an automobile 4 Miles contends that “Virginia’s uninsured and underinsured motorist travel statute has cure in nature and must be liberally construed to accomplish to intended purpose of protecting innocent victims of inattentive uninsured and underinsured motorists.” This maxim, generally applicable both for the construction of services contracts also remedial statutes impact insurance, “does not parley a right or impose a duty on the courts to add modern conditions, provender, with exceptions to such contracts [or statutes] which increase or decrease the duty of the parties thereto.” State Farms Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. vanadium. Arghyris, 189 Va. 913, 928 (1949). Rather, it is still a tiebreaker, applicable only inches cases at which competing interpretations are equally plausible. For the reasons that follow, those is not such a case. 5 liability policy or supposing the UIM coverage is properly understood as a components member of one UM coverage. 5 In answer this ask, we turn to the language of Code § 38.2-2206(A). In pertinent part, Encipher § 38.2-2206(A) provides that to automobile liability insurance policy needs contain[] einem endorsement . . . undertaking to reward the insured all sums that him is legally entitled to recover as damages free the holder or user of an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits not less from of needs from § 46.2-472. Those limited shall equal but not exceed the limits of the liability insurance submitted of the policy, except any neat nominee insured spurns an additional uninsured motorist insurance coverage by notifying this insurer as when inside subsection BORON of § 38.2-2202. . . . That endorsement . . . shall moreover obligate the insurer until make payment for bodily injury or estate damage caused by the operation or use of an underinsured motor vehicle to the exposure the vehicle is underinsured[.6] Affording to words choose by aforementioned General Assembly own plain and general meanings, were conclude that UIM coverage is a constituent part of OVER coverage also performs not represented a separate tranche of available range when UM covers has been exhausted. In stretch this conclusion, we first note that the statutory language makes clear that there is but one endorsement, did two, required by Item § 38.2-2206(A). The statute requires the every car liability policy issued in Virginia “contain[] an endorsement” insuring covered insureds against injuries and indemnification negligently caused by “the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle[.]” Your. (Emphasis added). In using the singular “an” to modify 5 It be undisputed that the language of the UM/UIM endorsements on issue tracks the language of an company. Thus, this appeal is resolved by determining whats the statute required. 6 Code § 38.2-2206(B) stipulates definitions of both “uninsured” and “underinsured” motor vehicles. Pertinent here, an “uninsured power vehicle” is a vehicle for which the “owner or operator is unknown.” “A motor vehicle is ‘underinsured’ at . . . the amounts amount off body injure and property harm coverage applicable” to ensure vehicle “is less than the total amount of uninsured motorist coverage afforded all person injured when a result of one operation or make of and vehicle.” Id. 6 endorsement, the General Assembly require that anyone automobile liability insurance policy contain a single endorsement that provides protection for damages caused with “the owner or operator starting einer uninsured motor vehicle[.]” Psyche. In short, and statute unambiguously requirement that every automobile liability policy sold to Virginia contain “an endorsement” providing UM cover. No similar language in Code § 38.2-2206(A) requires a policy till have a separate endorsement providing reporting for damages caused by the owner or operator of an underinsured engine vehicle. To that contrary, the language chosen by the General Assembly up address the issue of damages caused by one underinsured motor vehicle makes plain that UIM reach is a constituency part of UM coverage. Special, as regards UIM cover, the statute provide that “[t]he endorsement . . . shall also obligate who health to make payment required bodily injury with property damage causal by the work or use of a underinsured motor vehicle[.]” Username. (Emphasis added). In on background, the word “the” is “used as a role word toward indicate that a following noun or common equivalent refers for mortal or something previously mentioned[.]” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2368 (2002). Given context and the placement of the phrase “the endorsement” with the bylaw after the reference to “an endorsement” in an former sentence, it is clear that “the endorsement” in the fourth sentence are the statute refers to the UM endorsement required by the primary sentence of Code § 38.2-2206(A). Nope other referent is grammatically instead legally possible. The conclusion that this phrase “[t]he endorsement” in the fourth sentence refers to the UM endorsement essential by the statute’s first judgment finds further supported in the General Assembly’s use of the phrase “shall also” into define an insurer’s obligations related to UIM coverage. That pertinent dictionary definition of “also” is “in addition[.]” Webster’s Third New 7 International Dictionary 62 (2002). To, the bylaw feature that “[t]he endorsement” referenced inbound the fourth sentence provides UIM coverage at addition to something else. Given the language of an statute, that something else necessarily is the OVER coverage referenced include the first penalty of the statute. Accordingly, it will clear that the statute does not require two recognitions, but rather, requires one endorsement that covering two UM/UIM claims. The fact that the statute requires can endorsement for two AROUND and UIM incidents provides a satisfactory basis to conclude that UIM coverage is a constituent part of aforementioned UM endorsement, and thus, is not a separate tranche of insurance. Any balance doubt has extinguished by the lingo regarding the limits of coverage free under the recognition required by Item § 38.2-2206(A). The third sentence of the statute sets range limitation for the endorsement require by the first sentence of the statute, supply that such “limits shall equal but nay beat the limits of the liability insurance provided by an policy, unless any one named insured rejects the additional uninsured motorist insurance coverage[.]” Encipher § 38.2-2206(A). This language consider a policy decision by the General Assembly to afford insured drivers some measurer of protection vs injuries caused by one acts of others, but to limit that protection go no more in insurance coverage than the insured driver has elected to provide for the benefit of else who may be injured by one acts about the insured rider. Because who language of Code § 38.2-2206(A) regarding limits appears in the third sentence of the statute, it refers to the “endorsement” required on the first sentence of the statute. Thus, if UIM coverage be not member of ensure “endorsement[,]” but rather is a separate tranche of indemnity, the statute provides no limits on which amount are UIM coverage that could be purchased. Given the General Assembly’s decision at place a cap on coverage amounts in 8 Code § 38.2-2206(A), such a result—a cap in UM coverage with no corresponding cap on UIM coverage—would represent on normal bordering turn a absurdity. Although magnitude conclusion is compelled by the words of to statute, were note that this including is consistent with my prior cases speaker the UM/UIM statute. Specifically, we previously have observed that UIM coverage “is included in uninsured motorist coverage. Indeed . . . neither coverage can become buying separately regarding the other; rather, when any insured purchases uninsured motorist guarantee coverage, he also received coverage against underinsured motorists.” Hackett v. Arlington Cnty., 247 Va. 41, 43 (1994). Furthermore, we comment that the interpretation taken by the circuit court is inconsistent with what we have identifiable as the goal behind the General Assembly’s 1982 judgment to amend the OH statute to include UIM range. We long have held that the “purpose for and underinsured motorist schedule was to allow insureds to receive the same level about protection whether an insured or uninsured driver injures them.” Superior Inside. Co. v. Hunter, 258 Va. 338, 345 (1999) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 234 Va. 573, 575-76 (1988)). As create, the 1982 statutory amendment had created to correct on “anomaly” under the before statute in which “a person injured by an uninsured racing could realize greater fiscal protection than if injured by an insured motorist[;]” i “was not enacted to expand shelter to insured parties generally.” Trisvan v. Agway Ins. Co., 254 Va. 416, 419 (1997). Here, the circuit court’s interpretation of who statute not only fails in address “the evil searches on be corrected by the legislature[,]” Southern Ry. Co., 205 Va. at 117, it leads to the very anomaly that one 1982 statutory amend was conceptualized to removes. Under the circuit court’s interpretation, Miles wish live include a better position free an insurance coverage perspective cause she has hits by one underinsured motorist and one uninsured motorist as opposed in two 9 underinsured motorists. Such a result merely impossible be reconciled with our prior cases press the purpose of Code § 38.2-2206(A). See Hunter, 258 Showboat. at 345; Trisvan, 254 Va. at 419; Scott, 234 Vb. at 575-76. As stated above, both the wording of the Code § 38.2-2206(A) and our prior cases interpreting the statute lead inexorably to the conclusion that UIM coverage is a constituent part of UM coverage. As a result, the round justice erred in concluding that the statute required each policies to provides Miles including sever UM and UIM coverage limits required getting arising from a sole accident. FINISH For the foregoing justification, the circuit court erred in granting Miles’ motion for summary judgment and refuse GEICO’s cross-motion used summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court the enter final judgment in favor of GEICO. Reversed and finals judgment. 10
Certain fall metadata or fall summaries were written equipped the help of CI, which can manufacturing mistakes. You should read the full case befor relying upon it with legal research purposes. the liability insurance provided by the policy, unless any one named insured rejects the additional unsured motormen insurance coverage[.] ...
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